Catholicism, Ethics and Health Care Policy by Lisa Sowle Cahill
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 32 
Number 1 Volume 32, Number 1 Article 4 
October 2017 
Catholicism, Ethics and Health Care Policy 
Lisa Sowle Cahill 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Ethics in Religion Commons, and the Health Law and Policy 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa Sowle Cahill (1988) "Catholicism, Ethics and Health Care Policy," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , 
Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol32/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 





The Catholic Church's moralpositions have the potential to shape pub-
lic discussion and policy only to the extent that they can be put forward
in terms which are accessible and convincing to citizens in general, in-
cluding those who do not accept the specifically religious authority of
Roman Catholicism.
The interest of the Catholic Church in health care policy has been
much in evidence in the past decade, not only through the activity of the
Catholic laity in their capacity as American citizens, but also through the
involvement of members of the Church hierarchy and even through that
of ecclesial bodies such as the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops and the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. A na-
tional event which raised pointedly the question of the extent and legiti-
macy of such involvement was the 1984 U.S. presidential campaign, which
featured controversy over Catholic candidates' support of national abor-
tion policy. Over the objections of New York Cardinal John J. O'Connor,
Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro and New York
Governor Mario Cuomo insisted that they could not translate their relig-
iously-based personal opposition to abortion into the public arena of law
and law enforcement.
The reasons they gave for this conclusion were somewhat different.
Ferraro tended to rely on the distinction between personal conviction and
public policy in a pluralist society, concluding essentially that Catholics
should not attempt to impose their moral commitments on others.
Cuomo, on the other hand, did not resist as strongly the suggestions of
O'Connor that Catholic views of the rights of the unborn have an appro-
priate role to play in changing national policy. Instead, he maintained
t This Article is taken from Thirty-First Annual Robert Cardinal Bellarmine Lecture,
delivered at St. Louis University, October 28, 1987. It was previously published at 34
THEOLOGY DIG. 303 (1987).
* Bellarmine Lecturer 1987, Associate Professor of Theology, Boston College.
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that there is at present in our society no consensus on the moral status of
fetuses or on the exceptional justifying reasons for abortion, and that any
just and enforceable law must be grounded in a consensus supporting it.
This debate between the Church and the Catholic politician exempli-
fies in quite a clear way two points of confusion regarding involvement of
the Church in the public policy arena. The first is a confusion between
morality and religion; the second is a confusion between morality and
policy.
A. Morality and Religion
Religion has to do with the relationship between humanity and God,
while morality has to do with the relationships among human persons and
among human communities. Thus, convictions about what it is right and
wrong to do to or for other human beings are not as such to be classified
as "religious" beliefs.
Ideas of morality can be grounded in or encouraged by religious be-
liefs; for instance, in biblical themes such as "image of God," "love of
neighbor," "concern for the poor and oppressed," "self-sacrifice for
others," and so on. In the category of religious grounding for moral ideas,
we can also include the teachings of religious groups or traditions, such as
papal addresses and encyclicals, Vatican declarations, or episcopal state-
ments, such as those on contraception, euthanasia, abortion, or infertility
therapies.
The first point of confusion, between morality and religion, is rooted
in the idea that the influence of moral commitments which are religiously
motivated is or should be limited to members of the religious group which
supplies the motivation. There is no valid reason why this should be so as
long as the moral commitments in question can be expressed and de-
fended in terms which make sense to those outside the group. The real
issue is not whether religious insights shape and guide moral commit-
ments, but whether those commitments are also intelligible on broader
grounds.
To put it another way, moral values and norms held by Catholics
may be supported by reasons which go beyond their particular religious
beliefs. In the case of abortion, Catholics may have a special commitment
to defending the unborn because of the degree of emphasis which has
been placed on this by the Church. But even so, this commitment is not a
narrowly "religious" issue. Catholics and other religious persons have a
right to become involved in the public debate to the extent that they can
defend their position in a language which makes sense to persons from
other religious and moral traditions. In other words, they must be able to
discuss the status of the fetus, the moral significance of prenatal develop-
ment, maternal welfare and rights, and social support systems for preg-
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nant women and for children, in terms accessible and convincing to non-
Catholics. If they enter public debate on these terms, then their moral
arguments cannot be dismissed as attempts to "impose" religious beliefs
on persons with different convictions.
The erroneous idea that Catholic moral values have no place in pub-
lic debate because they are really matters of religious faith was accepted
perhaps too easily by Geraldine Ferraro when she took the position that
as a loyal Catholic she followed Church teaching on abortion, but could
not force that teaching on her pluralist constituency. The real question
should have been whether the Church's critique of national abortion pol-
icy has any cogent ethical merit to it, apart from its backing by religious
authority.
B. Morality and Public Policy
Not everything that falls in the category of morality-even publicly
discussible morality-is a proper object of legislation or formal and en-
forced social policy.
First, there is a legitimate distinction to be made between private
and public moral conduct. It is appropriate to regulate the latter, but
probably in most cases not the former. In other words, law has to do with
protecting the common good; behavior which concerns only private indi-
viduals who freely participate in it ("consenting adults") need not be pro-
hibited by law even if it is immoral, or is considered to be so by some
persons. Prohibition failed because it attempted to regulate private be-
havior in conformity with the moral ideas of a minority. However, we still
prohibit and punish socially destructive behaviors related to the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages, such as drunken driving or "drunk and
disorderly" conduct in public. Some persons consider contraception im-
moral, but legal interference is generally agreed to be inappropriate. Le-
gal restriction of pornography and prostitution remains controversial pre-
cisely because there is lack of agreement on the degree to which these
immoral activities, if undertaken by "consenting adults," really have an
impact on the larger social good. In the case of abortion, the major con-
troverted point is also whether the activity is indeed public or private.
Does it harm the common good or the good of nonconsenting persons
whom it affects? "Pro-choice" proponents do not see the fetus as an en-
tity with protectable status, and thus tend to construe abortion as a pri-
vate decision of the mother. "Pro-life" proponents do see the fetus as
protectable, and thus want to restrict the decisions of those who would
harm or destroy it, arguing that these decisions are a public danger. Reli-
gious belief is not the major issue here, but rather, whether arguments on
either side can be made on good philosophical grounds. To take a recent
example from Church teaching, the Vatican Instruction on reproductive
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technologies holds the embryo to be inviolable because of its status as a
"person." The document uses the terms "personal presence," "human
life," "individual," and "person." It also says expressly that it is not tak-
ing a "philosophical" position on whether or not the embryo is a person.
Nonetheless, the document does affirm that the magisterium has "con-
stantly" taught that "the human being is to be respected and treated as a
person from the moment of conception."1 Needless to say, this is not an
argument capable of moving protection of the embryo into the public pol-
icy arena as a matter of public, as distinct from religious, interest.
Moreover, on the question of viable public policy, we have to go still
further than determining whether a moral activity has some public status.
This brings me to my second point regarding the distinction between mo-
rality and public policy.
Even public moral conduct can be restricted or required by law only
under certain conditions, conditions which ensure that legislation or pol-
icy will be just and effective. Otherwise the policy is worse than useless; it
undermines respect for law and for the authority of government. This was
a point which Governor Cuomo seemed to grasp in 1984, but which may
have eluded Cardinal O'Connor. Cuomo resisted the efforts of the Church
representative to influence Cuomo's cooperation with abortion policy, not
because he saw such efforts as unwarranted religious intrusion, but be-
cause, even granting the moral arguments against abortion, there is not
yet in our society a consensus on the immorality of abortion.2 Cuomo may
or may not have been right about the absence of consensus. At least one
legislator, State Senator David Carlin of Rhode Island, disagreed, saying
that there is more consensus than is usually supposed about the immoral-
ity of "abortion on demand," the use of abortion as a "back up" means of
birth control, and abortions late in pregnancy.' The point, however, is
that the presence or absence of consensus is a relevant consideration in
formulating policy.
If consensus is lacking, it may be impossible to enforce the law justly
and equitably, with the consequence that the law produces more injustice
than it remedies." The Church has an obligation to work toward public
consensus on those issues in which it has a stake (a religiously-motivated
' Vatican Doctrinal Statement, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and
on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, reprinted in N.Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A-14, col. 5.
' See Remarks of Gov. Mario Cuomo at University of Notre Dame, Religious Beliefs and
Public Morality (Sept. 13, 1984), reprinted in 14 ORIGINs 234 (1984); Remarks of Gov.
Mario Cuomo at St. Francis College, Brooklyn, N.Y., Abortion and the Law (Oct. 3, 1984),
reprinted in 14 ORIGINs 301 (1984).
' See Carlin, Patchy Garment: How Many Votes Has Bernardin?, COMMONWEAL, Aug. 10,
1984, at 422.
See Carlin, Abortion, Religion, and the Law, 151 AM. 356 (1984).
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stake), and arguments about what would constitute a morally respectable
consensus in a humane society should be its major contribution to public
policy debates.
An important note to add is that law can have an educative function
as well as a representative one. This is especially true in our society,
whose members often tend quite simplistically to equate the legal with
the moral. Slavery was ended in our nation without the consensus of
those who were most economically dependent on it; even the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was enacted without the backing of a full national consensus.
This means that the notion of "consensus" required for defensible law
should not be interpreted too strictly, and that, as a consequence, this
notion may be difficult to define precisely. There must be consensus ade-
quate to enforcement of the law; this will not necessarily mean that all
American citizens agree with it.
The theologian Charles Curran, drawing on Catholic tradition, has
outlined three criteria with which to assess the moral justifiability of pub-
lic policy: (1) freedom is to be curtailed only when and to the extent nec-
essary to protect the "public order;" (2) the "public order," which justi-
fies intervention, includes social justice and human rights, the morality
necessary for cooperative social existence, and the preservation of public
peace; (3) a good law is one which is equitable and enforceable.' The issue
of consensus is part of this final criterion, while the distinction between
public and private morality is the basis of the first two.
CATHOLIC TRADITION AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
The distinctive contribution of Roman Catholic moral theology to
public policy discourse has been to insist that it be open to conversation
among partners representing quite diverse religious and philosophical tra-
ditions. In principle, Catholic tradition dissociates public moral discourse
from specifically religious backing. The approach derives from the Chris-
tian philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, who in turn borrowed from the "nat-
ural law" theory of Aristotle. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, all per-
sons share certain fundamental and culturally transcendent values, such
as protection of human life, respect for truth, the importance of procrea-
tion and education of the young, and social cooperation. These values
may be embodied or institutionalized differently in different cultures and
eras, but at least their basic meaning is evident to all reasonable persons,
who should freely seek to realize them in life. The Christian tradition
explains the existence of the moral law based on these values by referring
to a divine Creator of humanity, but does not limit knowledge of this law
to religious persons.
" C. CURRAN, MORAL THEOLOGY: A CONTINUING JOURNEY 214-15 (1982).
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The modern tradition of papal social encyclicals-from Leo XIII to
John Paul II-has articulated this basic understanding of morality in
terms of the "common good" as defining the normative nature of social
life; "justice" as the standard of the common good; mutual "rights" and
"duties" as the means by which justice is to be achieved; and "public
authority" and "law" as the guarantors of rights, duties, and social jus-
tice. To use the framework "common good" is to claim both that there
can be general consistency in formal definitions of what enhances human
life in society and that it is necessary to pose continually the substantive
question of which social arrangements enhance human dignity concretely.
This essential perspective on society, morality, and policy was mas-
terfully translated into the American cultural setting by John Courtney
Murray, S.J. In We Hold These Truths, Murray asserts that "the Ameri-
can Proposition" rests not on mere pragmatism, but on:
the more traditional conviction that there are truths, that they can be
known; that they must be held; for, if they are not held, assented to, con-
sented to, worked into the texture of institutions, there can be no hope of
founding a true City, in which men may dwell in dignity, peace, unity, jus-
tice, well-being, freedom.'
A similar commitment to objective moral truths which form the basis of a
just, albeit religiously pluralist, society is at the heart of the recent NCCB
economics pastoral, Economic Justice for All. 7 Cardinal Joseph Bernar-
din has urged Catholics to contribute to a new American consensus on a
"consistent ethic of life" in many addresses, some of which are aimed spe-
cifically at the health care context.8 When the Catholic bishops address
policy questions, they may rely on their moral authority as Church lead-
ers, but their public policy recommendations will only be as convincing to
the American public as the arguments used to support them-arguments
which will be concerned not with religious obligations, but with justice,
duties, rights, and the nature of a society ruled by the common good of
all.
A fact of which Catholics are only gradually becoming aware is that
the guiding "natural law" ideal of a community of moral discourse in
which participants share a common language of reason, justice, and fun-
damental "human" values can become a reality in only a modified sense.
Murray, Bernardin, and the authors of the economics pastoral are suc-
cessful and persuasive in their arguments partly because their audience
6 J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTION ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION
9 (1964).
U.S. Bishop's pastoral letter and messages at U.S. Catholic Conference, Economic Justice
for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, reprinted in 16 ORIGINS 34 (1986).
' Cardinal Bernardin, The Consistent Ethic of Life, HEALTH PROGRESS, July-Aug. 1986, at
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shares some common fund of cultural values and experience. Indeed, sev-
eral disagreements about their interpretations of what is "social justice"
or "respect for life" have arisen because discussion partners do not always
come from exactly the same social, economic, and political "place." I
think it is illusory to speak of "natural law" morality as though the lan-
guage of natural law guaranteed access to some realm of public discourse
which completely transcends the moral and even religious commitments
of our own traditions. At a recent conference at Georgetown University,
Bryan Hehir remarked that even though the NCCB "peace pastoral" is
directed at public discourse about defense policy, the bishops writing it
were motivated to cling fiercely to noncombatant immunity by the Chris-
tian ideal of nonviolence and the Catholic commitment to protect inno-
cent life no matter what the consequences.9 Perhaps the realm of natural
law discourse about public policy is best envisioned as a sphere into
which one goes, not stripped naked of all particularistic commitments,
but rather, in search of areas of overlap and agreement in the communi-
ties (religious, moral, political, philosophical) to which one's discussion
partners belong. In the modern, first-world, Judeo-Christian, Western po-
litical and cultural community called the U.S.A., the language of rights,
duties, justice, and common good expresses some fundamental agree-
ments which might not be as clear as we move into conversation with
more distant cultures. And even in the United States, comments Hehir,
"religious differences will yield different conceptions of how to address
medical ethics and standards of justice."'0 The point to keep in mind,
however, is that religiously-grounded conceptions of social morality have
the ability and right to survive in the arena of public policy to the extent
that they can publicly persuade. When it seeks the end of public persua-
sion about important moral values, the Church is as legitimate a social
actor as any other group bound by common interests, the merits of which
it desires to bring to the attention of the social body.
I will now indicate some of the reasons why and the extent to which
the Catholic Church should be interested in public policy, by considering
four additional moral dilemmas in health care: artificial sustenance,
health care for the elderly, reproductive techniques, and AIDS. On these,
as on other policy issues, morality can be discussed in terms of justice,
rights and duties, both of the individual and of the community. American
notions of individual rights are particularly strong, can become distorted
' Conference at Georgetown University, Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals: Founda-
tional Issues (Oct. 13-16, 1986). Hehir's paper is entitled, "Religious Pluralism and Social
Policy: The Case of Health Care." The proceedings of the conference are to be published in
a volume edited by Tristram Englehardt and Stuart Spicker, for the Philosophy and
Medicine Series of D. Reidel & Co.
"0 Hehir, supra note 9, at 24.
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into individualism, and have deeply influenced these debates. With her
equally strong commitment to place rights in the context of duties and of
sociality, the Church as a moral teacher (not only a religious teacher) is
justified in attempting to influence the way rights and duties are inter-
preted in this particular area of medical care.
A. Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
Catholic tradition provides an approach to acceptance or refusal of
medical treatment which is nuanced, flexible, and able to be expressed in
terms of common moral values. The guiding principle in cases of life-pro-
longing treatment has been the distinction between ordinary and ex-
traordinary means of life support. The Church has an interest not just in
individual decision-making, but also in public policy, because social jus-
tice requires that practices be institutionalized in medical care which pro-
vide for the protection of individual rights and also for the support of the
common good. To say that certain policies regarding treatment denigrate
the value of human life is not to make any narrowly religious claim but to
enter as a religiously motivated actor upon the scene of public discourse
about the nature and structure of a just society. The questions of social
morality at stake in the nutrition/hydration debate include at least the
following.
Do debilitated members of a society retain the same right to share in
social goods as actively contributing members? Is there a duty which cor-
responds to this right? Is it a duty of friends and family only, of the med-
ical profession, of persons or groups who have previously contracted to be
responsible for the sick, or of broader civic communities, and even of the
society as a whole? Should the fulfillment of such duties be enforced by
law? Should the definition of an appropriate share in social goods be tai-
lored to the individual circumstances of each member of society? Is sick-
ness a relevant circumstance? Can severe or terminal illness be an indica-
tor in favor of reduced medical "therapy?" Is artificial nutrition more like
a medical technology or more like natural eating and drinking? What im-
plications will the resolution of this question in one direction or the other
have for social attitudes towards illness, medical technology, and technol-
ogy in general? At what point should individual preferences or even needs
be limited by their effect on other persons or on social attitudes and fu-
ture practices?
These are philosophical and social questions. They are important in
the establishment of policy on the provision of artificial sustenance.
Given the Catholic tradition of the value but nonabsoluteness of human
life, and the importance of the dignity of the person, a credible argument
can be made that artificial nutrition is to natural eating what respirator
therapy is to natural breathing. Nourishment and air are both basic
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human requirements. However, when these are technologically provided
to an individual in an extremely debilitated physical state, from which
there is no reasonable hope of recovery, the removal of these medical life
supports may sometimes serve the best interests of the patient. With-
holding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition is no more like "starving" the
patient than withholding or removing a respirator is like "suffocating"
him or her. Kevin O'Rourke, John Paris, and Richard McCormick are
among the Catholic theologians who make this essential argument.1"
However, the key point to be stressed is not so much this particular con-
clusion, but that debates about artificial nutrition and hydration are not
specifically religious matters. Church teaching may illumine relevant
moral insights, but its persuasive power must rest on the cogency of its
arguments about what constitutes an optional means of medical life sup-
port, given the human values of life, care for the sick, prudent social pol-
icy, and so on.
There is one element in the Catholic natural law tradition which per-
haps should be emphasized more than it has been in regard to health
care: the importance of seeing every individual as part of the social body.
It is no longer sufficient to handle questions of medical morality in an
individualistic manner. On the one hand, this means that we must be
careful not to institutionalize practices in one area which will threaten
respect for life in other areas. Some argue that withdrawing feeding, even
if artificially provided, from very sick patients, will discourage basic care
for others who seem to take from society more than they can contribute.
On the other hand, respect for life does not end with prolonging biological
existence. To focus on individual patients to the exclusion of their place
within a larger context of health care is to ignore the sociality of the per-
son, and to forget that the quality of life of all persons calls for social
policy protection. One of the most difficult questions which our prosper-
ous and technologically advanced society must face is that of distributive
justice for all our citizens, including justice in health resource allocation.
Both traditional moral analysis and recent court cases tend to address
questions of medical crisis intervention and life-prolonging therapy for
the hopelessly ill in isolation from broader considerations. Certainly the
Church, its members, and its representatives, have a role to play here.
One thinks appreciatively of the Catholic Health Association's task force
report, No Room in the Marketplace: The Health Care of the Poor,12 and
also of Cardinal Bernardin's efforts to broaden our understanding of "re-
" See O'Rourke, The A.M.A. Statement on Tube Feeding: An Ethical Analysis, 155 AM.
351 (1986).
2 Catholic Health Association's Task Force Report, No Room in the Marketplace: The
Health Care of the Poor, reprinted in abridged form, HEALTH PROGRESS, July-Aug. 1986, at
87 [hereinafter Health Care of the Poor].
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spect for life." He has pointed out repeatedly that there is moral inconsis-
tency in the fact that a minority, including newborns and the dying, re-
ceive aggressive and often expensive crisis intervention, while others do
not have basic and preventive care (for instance, before birth).13 Govern-
ment intervention through tax and welfare policy may be necessary. Ber-
nardin does not speak out of narrow religious conviction, nor to Catholics
only, when he urges:
We must defend the right to life of the weakest among us; we must also be
supportive of the quality of life of the powerless among us: the old and the
young, the hungry and the homeless, the undocumented immigrant and the
unemployed worker, the sick, the disabled and the dying.'
B. Health Care for the Elderly
Cardinal Bernardin's words call to our attention the fact that even in
a nation as prosperous as our own, social resources may not be distributed
equitably. Of course, his exhortation to protect society's weak or power-
less members throws into relief the fact that Americans in general enjoy a
relatively high standard of living. We take it for granted not only that
basic health needs should be met, but also that the costs of health care
should be distributed so that those who are economically well-off or
healthy will help bear the burden of health care for those who are poor or
who are the victims of catastrophic illness. This distribution of burdens is
accomplished both through private insurance programs and through tax-
funded public programs. In a helpful summary of the state of the health
care "safety net," the CHA task force report describes the coverage of-
fered by the largest public insurance programs: Medicaid, Medicare, and
tax benefits to employer-provided private health insurance."3 The report
reminds us that Medicaid covers only the poor in the welfare categories:
aged, blind, disabled, or families with dependent children. One large
"gap" in the net is by now familiar: middle-class persons who do not fit
these categories and are unable to buy insurance must spend all their
savings on medical care before they can rely on government funding.
For obvious reasons, the segment of the population most likely to
experience high health costs is the elderly. Medicare is the federal pro-
gram which targets the aged, who do not have to be poor to be eligible for
its benefits. However, the fact that Medicare coverage 'is not complete
coverage poses special burdens for the poor elderly. A particular problem
is the fact that neither Medicare nor most private insurance programs
pay for nursing home care:
13 Cardinal Bernardin, Health Care and the Consistent Ethic of Life, 15 ORIGINS 36 (1985).
" Id. at 38.
" Health Care of the Poor, supra note 12, at 89.
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Currently, Medicare payments account for less than half the total health
care bill of the elderly. Of the direct out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
elderly in 1983-about $30 billion-42 percent was consumed by nursing
home care, by far the largest component.6
Let us focus briefly on two interrelated aspects of this problematic
picture. The first is the nature of "just" health care for the elderly. The
second is the moral perspective which the Church can offer on the situa-
tion. First, as has been observed, a society which affirms the equal dignity
of all members will not exclude any group from a share in the goods of
that society simply because that group is more vulnerable or less able to
assert its own claims than the dominant classes. However, the question of
a just distribution of social goods must be answered with reference to two
factors: the availability of resources, and the possibility that access to
resources may vary legitimately according to relevant differences among
potential beneficiaries. Race, sex, and age are examples of differences
which do not reflect on the essential worth of persons, but which may or
may not be relevant to the way they are treated. When the characteristic
is irrelevant to the issue at hand, as it frequently is in education or em-
ployment, differential treatment is rightly called "discrimination." But in
some cases, including areas of health care, differences can be pertinent.
Some examples are special testing programs for persons who are suscepti-
ble to racially-linked diseases, preventive health care for youth, and ma-
ternity benefits for women. Can such differences be relevant to the limita-
tion or denial of certain types of health care as well? One obvious limit
can be set by considering the potential of a treatment to benefit the re-
cipient, especially in the case of crisis care measures which are expensive,
i.e., "scarce." An example of a current limiting policy of this sort is the
requirement that an organ recipient must be a good tissue match and
within certain age limits; otherwise a scarce resource may be "wasted."
Daniel Callahan, philosopher and director of the Hastings Center for
bioethics, observes that:
Currently, the provision of health care for the poor is set in the context of
high-technology medicine, which continually strives to improve health and
to extend life. This medical system, based on technological progress and
constant improvement, does not readily admit that death might be accept-
able, that old age and decline are a part of life, and that the good health of
the poor has to be understood in relation to economics."
At a meeting of a new CHA Task Force on Long-Term Care, Callahan
and others pointed out that federal funds provide far more care to the
,6 Iglehart & White, Catastrophic Health Insurance: Public/Private Role Debated, HEALTH
PROGRESS, Nov. 1986, at 10.
17 Callahan, A New Vision of Health, HEALTH PROGRESS, Dec. 1986, at 85-86.
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elderly than they do to children. A disproportionate share of Medicare
funds (thirty to thirty-five percent) is spent on individuals in their last
year of life, even though this group constitutes only five percent of Medi-
care enrollees. "'Don't use medicine to give a creeping immortality,' Cal-
lahan urged, pointing to the absurdity of giving artificial hearts to persons
in their 70's, 80's, and 90's."'" His remarks suggest that "catastrophic"
illness should be defined somewhat differently for those in the beginning
or prime of life, than for those near its natural end. It hardly would be
"ageist" to limit access of the elderly to technologically sophisticated life-
extending care if some of the resources saved were channeled into efforts
to provide a higher quality of life-even if not a longer one-for the eld-
erly themselves. 9
The current medical care system, in other words, aims its high-tech
strategies at those who can benefit from and pay for intensive interven-
tions-whether or not long-term benefit is to be expected; whether or not
a less technology-intensive measure would be adequate or better; whether
or not others less able to pay could benefit equally or more; and whether
or not such interventions in general draw resources away from more pro-
ductive and ultimately more fair forms of medical care, both acute and
preventive. Given the fact that medical resources are not infinite, it is
simply not possible to extend indefinitely the life of every person. Pre-
tending to do so by applying last-resort measures to any person immedi-
ately at hand in a hospital bed only disguises the fact that the system
works against increasing the level of good health enjoyed by Americans
generally, and against better health care for the poor in particular. In-
deed, a technology-intensive, last-resort mentality actually militates
against proper respect and humane care for gradually debilitated elderly
persons for whom sensitive assistance in the necessities of daily living and
considerate personal attention will be of most value in enriching their de-
clining years. The implications hardly need to be spelled out in terms of
the duties of respect for human dignity and of distributive justice both to
give public financial support to forms of elderly care resembling the nurs-
ing home or home health aid, rather than the hospital; and to reconsider
the values behind distribution of benefits within the health care estab-
lishment. Reconsideration of allocation of resources to health care in rela-
tion to expenditures for other social objectives, such as education and de-
fense, looms as an important but virtually unapproachable further task.
How can or should the Church speak to these issues? The CHA's
task force report reflects the NCCB economics pastoral in referring to an
" CHA Task Force Probes Long Term Care of the Elderly, 3 CATHOLIC HEALTH WORLD 1
(1987).
,9 Callahan, Rethinking Health Care for the Aged, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1987, at A-39, col.
2.
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evangelical "preferential option for the poor." I think such a preferential
option has most usefulness in appealing to the Christian community, for
instance, the Catholic medical center or the religious order engaged in
care for the elderly. To argue that the poor should be "preferred" pre-
cisely and simply because they are suffering and in need, is to make an
appeal to Jesus' command to love one's neighbor, and his illustration of
neighbor-love with the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:29-37). Re-
ligious commitment can and should serve as a powerful motivator of mo-
rality. Some Christians would even argue that Christian discipleship en-
tails some special moral obligations (such as loving one's enemy) which
seem "foolish" to the unconverted but which are mandatory for the be-
liever. However, neither any special duties that faith may entail, nor the
reasons of faith for fulfilling universal human moral obligations, are ap-
propriate subjects for public policy debate.
A perhaps more persuasive public argument can be made by using
the terms of justice, including the delineation of "rights" and "duties" so
close to the heart of the North American political tradition. Catholic dis-
cussion participants may have reference to those concepts as they have
been framed by the modern social encyclical tradition. On the one hand,
this tradition avoids the tendency of United States individualism to stress
rights to the neglect of duties and of social cooperation. On the other
hand, it need not rely on specifically Christian (biblical) imagery, espe-
cially variations on gospel rhetoric that draw on the "liberation theolo-
gies" of the economically disadvantaged third world nations. Emerging
from that context, a keynote such as "preferential option for the poor"
may well be a valid and vital interpretation of the gospel message and
even of social justice. However, it may go against the grain of the North
American traditions and vocabulary of independent individualism. The
"preferential option" language may thus suffer a diminishment of persua-
sive power in the process of translation to the North American context,
whatever its real merits in its indigenous setting, or its continuing merit
for those committed to the evangelical ideals of Jesus. The social encycli-
cals offer a language which may provide more ready access to United
States policy debates, informed as those debates are by a commitment to
''equal access" and a resistance to "preferential treatment."
In Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth), for instance, John XXIII
speaks of the responsibility of governmental authority to secure both the
rights and the duties of every individual and group. Every person has:
the right to life, to bodily integrity, and to the means which are necessary
and suitable for the proper development of life; these are primarily food,
clothing, shelter, rest, medical care, and finally the necessary social
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Nonetheless, "all members of the political community" are "entitled"
to "share in" the "common good." Since this share will vary "in different
ways according to each one's tasks, merits, and circumstances," the "civil
authority must take pains to promote the common good of all, without
preference for any single citizen or civic group." Still, it may sometimes
serve justice and equity if the government gives "more attention to the
less fortunate members of the community, since they are less able to de-
fend their rights and to assert their legitimate claims." 1 To sum it up,
the encyclical uses the framework of the common good to assert that all
persons should be considered equally, and enjoy both a right to life's ba-
sic physical and spiritual necessities, and a duty to use them well. The
manner in which one shares in the common good may be defined in light
of one's special circumstances without undermining basic equality. It may
be the duty of government, as it coordinates competing needs, to give
special attention to those less able to assert their claim to just treatment.
The language of justice goes beyond that of charity in opening Catholic
Christian moral values out onto the horizon of public policy, allowing
church leaders to make their case in defense of social justice, while escap-
ing any accusation that they put forward only a narrowly "religious"
posture.
C. A Note on AIDS
Without going into any great detail, it is possible to indicate how
such a framework also would apply to a difficult social and medical prob-
lem such as the AIDS epidemic. We are all aware that AIDS may be ac-
quired through activities to which Church leaders and others raise moral
objections-though those who engage in such activities are not the only
ones afflicted with AIDS. We also know that AIDS carriers present a risk
of fatal infection to those with whom they come into contact-though
evidence indicates strongly that the contact which transmits AIDS must
be very close contact of a few narrowly specified kinds.
The AIDS patient, like any other patient, must be approached in
terms of justice. Beyond the fact that many AIDS sufferers, especially
children, contract this terrible disease through no fault of their own, it
must be insisted that moral culpability should not be a factor in deter-
mining treatment of the AIDS patient unless we are willing to apply that
standard uniformly. Are we willing to apply it to patients dying from lung
cancer, cirrhosis of the liver, heart disease, high blood pressure, or obesity
because they persisted in unhealthy habits? To women suffering a hemor-
20 John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, in SEVEN GREAT ENCYCLiCALS 291 (W. Gibbons ed. 1963).
2 Id. at 301-02.
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rhage after an abortion? To men with gonorrhea or syphilis? To al-
coholics, drug addicts, or sex abusers seeking rehabilitation? To accident
victims who were careless or did not wear protective clothing? Certainly
the lines of causation in all these cases are many and pluriform, and the
task of judgment correspondingly complex and presumptuous. To single
out the suspected homosexual as a non-candidate for medical care would
give reason for an accusation of "homophobia"-that is, singling out ho-
mosexuality as an object of particular fear and loathing among all the
other forms of human activity to which moral and prudential objections
reasonably could be made. Care of AIDS victims is certainly one area in
which public policy should not attempt to "legislate" sexual morality or
the morality of drug use. It would be virtually impossible to use such
policy to enact sanctions fairly and without causing greater social evils.
This is especially true in view of the fact that there is no clear consensus
in our society about the limits of acceptable adult sexual behavior.
Like any other carrier of infectious disease, however, the AIDS pa-
tient should be handled in a' manner which minimizes risk to health care
workers. Defining proper guidelines for treatment will, of necessity, in-
volve compromise between sensitive patient-care routines and protection
of the care-giver. Health care facilities can do much to reduce risk of
AIDS infection by adhering strictly to guidelines already published by the
Public Health Service, the American Hospital Association, and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration. Additional measures, such as
testing for the virus upon admittance to the hospital, or to the surgical
unit, may be justified. The right to privacy of the AIDS victim must be
respected, but this right is not an absolute in relation to the right of med-
ical personnel to be protected from fatal disease. Finally, the question of
wise and humane use of medical resources arises in the case of AIDS, as it
does in that of artificial nutrition and of care of the elderly in general.
AIDS victims are in desperate need of group living facilities and hospice
arrangements in which they can be afforded compassionate medical, so-
cial, psychological, and spiritual assistance from professionals trained to
manage the disease. Such special arrangements would help limit the eco-
nomic drain caused by overuse of hospitalization, and would help limit
risk of infection by concentrating AIDS care in the hands of a few who
would be prepared to handle it expertly.
D. Infertility Therapies
The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Instruction on Re-
spect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation:
Replies to Certain Questions of the Day is an example of an attempt to
influence social attitudes and public policy with essentially philosophical
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arguments about "the dignity of the person."22 The document makes fre-
quent reference to religious themes and to past Church teaching. How-
ever, the extent of its influence beyond the Catholic community will de-
pend on whether or not its analysis of common human values is rigorous
and convincing. The strongest part of the Vatican's case against technical
substitutes for natural intercourse rests in its objections to donor or sur-
rogate therapies which involve "outsiders" in the procreative efforts of
spouses. Given the moral and legal difficulties presented by the much-
publicized surrogate mother cases in the United States, it is reasonable to
assume that there exists in our culture a certain receptiveness to a critical
moral analysis of third-party infertility therapies. The document's argu-
ment that substitutes for natural intercourse within marriage also contra-
dict the intrinsic meanings of marriage and parenthood, and thus are also
morally "illicit," may turn out to be less persuasive. It may be less clear
experientially and philosophically that the "dignity" of sexuality and
marriage demand that the physical integrity of the act of sexual inter-
course be observed in each and every case. If public policy is the end in
view, it is not enough to appeal to the tradition of the Church, or to pre-
vious pronouncements of the magisterium. In the section on "Moral and
Civil Law," the document claims that:
the rights of the family and of the institution of marriage constitute funda-
mental moral values, because they concern the natural condition and inte-
gral vocation of the human person: at the same time they are constitutive
elements of civil society and its order.
The legislator is urged properly to take care for the "public order" and
"the common good," on the basis of "rational principles." Not inciden-
tally, this section focuses on respectful treatment of existing embryos and
on legal restriction of infertility therapies which reach beyond marriage,
rather than on intra-marital technologies. The effectiveness of these ex-
hortations will depend on the logical force and cultural sensitivity of the
arguments put forward in favor of regarding the embryo as having "from
conception" the full rights of a human person; and in favor of the moral
unity of marital commitment, sexual expression, and parenthood. The
Church's moral positions have the potential to shape public discussion
and policy only to the extent that they can be put forward in terms which
are accessible and convincing to citizens in general, including those who
do not accept the specifically religious authority of Roman Catholicism.
SUMMARY
Catholic experience with the abortion debate has taught us, first, that
" See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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the moral commitments of religious persons and -groups cannot be dis-
missed as. ",personal". and "private" if they can be argued on public
grounds. Second, it has shown that more than moral defensibility is re-
quired for a viable public policy. The Catholic contribution to public pol-
icy discourse has been the tradition's commitment to an objective moral
order, in principle knowable by all reasonable persons. It is best, however,
to picture the language of "natural law" as giving access to a sphere of
dialogue, rather than to a mythical trans-cultural realm. On questions
such as abortion, artificially administered nutrients, and reproductive
technologies, it is important to avoid the individualism of both the right
("duty to treat every person equally") and the left ("right to privacy"),
and to try to make sense of human dignity within the context of interde-
pendence and sociality. This project becomes especially important when
we consider the allocation of health care resources among groups, and set
allocation questions within a vision of the meaning and importance of life,
health, other life-enhancing goods, and death. A duty of mutual support
includes attention to society's most vulnerable, but it also presses the
question of a just distribution of community resources. Finally, the moral
authority of the Church in the public forum will be only as good as the
cogency, logic, and cultural nuance of its arguments. A lesson to be drawn
from the recent U.S. episcopal pastoral letters is that a broadly consulta-
tive process is helpful in achieving a consensus within the Church which
is in touch with the values of the culture in which it is situated, and
which can as a result speak effectively to that culture. Another lesson is
that it is indeed -appropriate for Catholic leaders to address specific
points of social policy, in a manner exhibiting equally the virtues of rea-
sonableness, courage, and modesty.
